# INDEX

#### Numbers

401 error message, 27, 28 403 error response, 31–32 407 error message, 27, 28 802.1x devices, audit program, 194 911 services, VoIP and, 153

### A

ACK (acknowledge) message (SIP), 21 active dictionary attack, in IAX, 100 - 102active eavesdropping of RTP, 82-87 audio insertion, 82-86 audio replacement, 87 **AES** (Advanced Encryption Standard) encryption limitations, 106 secure RTP with cipher, 182 Aircrack, 175 anonymous eavesdropping, 146 - 147Apache build, security issues, 121 ARP cache poisoning, 38 ARP monitoring, audit program, 194 ARP Poison Routing menu (Cain & Abel), 79 ASN.1-encoded buffer, 58, 59 Asterisk servers, 26, 93, 132 configuring, 4 connecting SIP client to, 142 for free calls, 138

for IVR services for users, 136 man-in-the-middle attack of, 102-103 to send pre-recorded messages, 148 - 150SRTP implementation steps, 183 attack surface on home wireless devices, 156 for RSA authentication, 94 audio files creating, 164 recording with hard phone, 117 from RTPInject, 85 saving RTP stream to, 82 audio insertion in RTP eavesdropping, 82-86 into Yahoo! Messenger calls, 170 audio replacement, in RTP eavesdropping, 87 audio RTP streams, capturing, 76 - 77auditing VoIP, for security best practices, 189-197 authentication, 13-14 audit program, 193 Denial of Service and, 67-68 in Google Talk, 170 for H.323 gatekeeper, 52 in IAX, 94-96 in SIP, 22, 27-29 audit program, 190 data collection for attacks, 34 and Vonage, 166 authentication packet, generating, 61

authorization audit program, 193 for H.323 protocol, 54-55 in VoIP, 14 AutoDiscovery, audit program, 196 availability, in VoIP, 14-15 Avaya 4600 service hard phone, settings from, 118 Call Center, 120-123 registering Asterisk server to, 145 identifying TFTP server on network, 116 Modular Messaging, 123–126 SRTP implementation steps, 183 TLS implementation steps, 181 VoIP hard phone, security issues, 115-120

## B

BackTrack Live CD, 4 baseline, for measuring VoIP, 190 boot image, for hard phones, 117 boot process, for hard phones, audit program, 196 brute-force attacks of E.164 alias, 65-66 to gain valid usernames, 31–32 offline, 59 buffer overrun attacks, IAX vs. SIP, 94 BYE message (RTP), 90 BYE method (SIP), 21, 25 Denial of Service attack and, 42 - 43

### C

Cain & Abel, 33, 36, 157, 175 for attack on Modular Messaging, 125 to capture RTP packets, 158, 163 for RTP man-in-the-middle attacks, 78-80, 159-160 for SSL man-in-the-middle attacks, 171 Hacking VoIP

support for Yahoo! Messenger RTP codecs, 169 call eavesdropping. See eavesdropping call redirection, 146-147 call reject attack, in IAX, 107-108 caller ID spoofing, 139–146 with iaxComm and VoIPJet, 140 - 142impact, 146 on internal network with VoIP and SIP, 144-146 from services on websites, 143-144 with SIP client, 142-143 Call-ID field (SIP), 21 CANCEL method (SIP), 21 for Denial of Service attack, 43 challenge (nonce), 27, 28, 29 challenge packet, from SIP server, 166 Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism (CRAM-MD5), 124 challenge/response method, IAX support for, 95 Cisco CallManager, 120-123 registering Asterisk server to, 145 SRTP implementation steps, 183 switches, hopping attacks from, 66 TLS implementation steps, 181 VoIP hard phone security issues, 115-120 sniffing network from, 115 cleartext transmission IAX support for, 94 by RTP, 74, 76 of TFTP/HTTP requests, 117 with Vonage, 157 commercial VoIP solutions, 154-167 Vonage, 154-161 conference calls risks of audio replacement, 87 security for, 67 (C) 2008 by Himanshu Dwivedi

Contact field (SIP), 21 Content-Length field (SIP), 21 Content-Type field (SIP), 21 contributing source for RTP (CSRC), 74 Conversation Log, for spoofed BYE message, 43 country code (CC), in E.164 alias, 14 CRAM-MD5 (Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism). 124 CSeq field (SIP), 21

#### D

D-Link, 173 data network, separating from voice network, 15 audit program, 194 Denial of Service attack. See DoS attack DHCP servers, audit program, 197 dictionary attack active, in IAX, 100-102 offline, 33, 35, 58, 166, 180 in IAX, 97-100 Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement, ZRTP and, 183 digest authentication, to SIP server, 28, 180 digital phones, 11 disconnecting calls in progress, HangUP attack to cause, 108 - 109display language, hard phone configuration, 118 DNS server audit program, 197 hard phone configuration, 118 lookup by Proxy server, 23 DNS spoofing techniques, 38 DoS (Denial of Service) attack, 88-91 for H.323 protocol via H.225 nonStandardMessage, 71 - 72Hacking VoIP (C) 2008 by Himanshu Dwivedi

via host unreachable packets, 70 - 71via NTP. 67-68 via UDP, 68-69 in IAX, 106-110 call reject, 107-108 HangUP attack, 108-109 Hold (QUELCH) attack, 109-110 Registration Reject, 106-107 in RTP attack message flooding, 88-89 RTCP Bye, 89-91 in SIP attack via BYE message, 42-43 via REGISTER, 44 via un-register, 44-45 dpkt library, installing, 84, 163 dsniff (Linux), 163 DTMF tool, 137-138 duplicate error message, 65-66

## E

E.164 alias audit program, 192–193 availability, 63-64 for H.323 endpoint, 14, 63-65 for H.323 protocol, 54-55 enumeration, 65-66 E.164 hopping attacks, for H.323 protocol, 66-67 eavesdropping anonymous, 146-148 securing SIP session information from, 180 with Vonage, 157-161 eavesdropping of RTP active, 82-87 audio insertion, 82-86 audio replacement, 87 passive, 76-82 Cain & Abel for man-in-themiddle attacks, 78-80 man-in-the-middle attack, 76 - 77with Vonage, 157-161 with Wireshark, 80-82

eBay, 151 Ekiga, 4, 52 eNapkin, 127 encryption in SIP, 29-31 with S/MIME, 30-31 with TLS, 29-30 in Skype, 173 symmetric, for H.323 protocol, 52 - 53in VoIP, 15 endpoint, 11 spoofing for H.323 protocol, 63 - 65enumeration E.164 alias for H.323 protocol, 65 - 66MAC addresses on subnet, 159 SIP devices on network, 25–26 username, 65–66 for H.323 protocol, 56-57 in IAX, 96-97 in SIP attack, 31-33 enumIAX tool, 96–97 error messages, enumerating SIP usernames with, 31-32 etherchange, 63 Ethernet connection, phones with, 11 expiration value, in REGISTER method (SIP), and unregister process, 44-45 Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP), for Google Talk, 170 extensions.conf file, 4, 137 backup, 132 and caller ID spoofing, 145 information from VoIPJet, 143 for Zfone, 185

## F

firewalls, 186–187 From field (SIP), 21 FTP (File Transfer Protocol), security issues, 121 fuzzing SIP, 45–47 Hacking VoIP (C) 2008 by Himanshu Dwivedi

### G

Garbutt, Alex, 84, 163 GCF (Gatekeeper Confirmation) packet, 128 GetIf, 119 Google Talk, 13, 170–171 lightweight SPIT with, 150–151 government data protection standards, compliance with, 9 GRQ (Gatekeeper Request) packet, 128

## H

H.225 protocol, 49 Denial of Service via nonStandardMessage, 71 - 72for H.323 authentication, 58 audit program, 190 hex information example of registration request packet, 62 **Registration Admission Status** (RAS), 55-56 Registration Reject packets, 68-69 H.239 protocol, 49 H.245 protocol, 49 H.323 client, 4 configuring, 5 H.323 gatekeeper, 11, 50 redirecting, 127-128 registering with, 51-52 SBC interaction with, 187 H.323 gateway, 11, 50 H.323 protocol, 9, 10, 19, 49 default authentication type, 13 E.164 alias for endpoint, 14 network reliability, 72 ports, 50 security attacks, 55–72 Denial of Service via H.225 nonStandardMessage, 71 - 72Denial of Service via host unreachable packets, 70 - 71

Denial of Service via NTP, 67 - 68Denial of Service via UDP, 68 - 69E.164 alias enumeration, 65 - 66E.164 hopping attacks, 66-67 endpoint spoofing, 63-65 password retrieval, 58-59 replay attack, 60-63 username enumeration, 56 - 57security basics, 50-55 authorization, 54-55 enumeration, 50-52 password hashing, 53-54 public key, 54 symmetric encryption, 52-53 VoIP deployments with devices, 12 H.323.conf file, 4 H.323-ID, Wireshark for sniffing, 56 - 57H.450 protocol, 49 H.460 protocol, 49 handsets, 173-174 HangUP attack, in IAX, 108-109 hard phones, 11, 20, 115-120 audit program, 196 cable connections, and network vulnerability, 114-115 call handling for, 120 compromising configuration file. 116-117 SNMP weaknesses, 119–120 uploading malicious configuration file, 117-119 vulnerability to DoS attack, 71 header in packet, 9 Hewlett-Packard, 67 HMAC-SHA1, secure RTP with, 182-183 Hold (QUELCH) attack, in IAX, 109 - 110home VoIP services, 9, 153-154 host unreachable packets, Denial of Service via, 70–71

HTTP protocol as cleartext protocol, 116 and SIP, 20, 180 hub, sniffing on, 76 Hunt, 83

#### I

IAX (Inter-Asterisk eXchange) protocol, 9, 11, 93 audit program, 192 authentication, 94-96 audit program, 191 default type, 13 control frame sequencing predictability, 103 VoIP deployments with devices, 12 IAX client, 4 configuring, 5-6 IAX security attacks, 96-110 active dictionary attack, 100-102 Denial of Service, 106–110 call reject, 107-108 HangUP attack, 108–109 Hold (QUELCH) attack, 109-110 Registration Reject, 106-107 man-in-the-middle attack, 102 - 103MD5-to-plaintext downgrade attack, 103-105 offline dictionary attack, 97-100 username enumeration, 96–97 IAXAuthJack, 104-105 IAX.Brute tool, 99 iaxComm, for caller ID spoofing, 140 - 142iax.conffile, 4 backup, 132 IAXHangup.py tool, 108–109 ICMP, Host Unreachable packets to execute DoS attack, 70 infrastructure VoIP attacks, 113 Avaya Call Center, 120–123 Cisco CallManager, 120–123

infrastructure VoIP attacks, continued hard phones, 115–120 compromising configuration file, 116-117 SNMP weaknesses, 119-120 uploading malicious configuration file, 117-119 Modular Messaging, 123–126 Nessus for discovering vulnerable services, 123 Nikto to scan web management interfaces, 122–123 Nmap to scan VoIP devices, 121-122 server impersonation, 126-128 redirecting H.323 gatekeepers, 127-128 spoofing SIP proxies and registrars, 126-127 vendor-specific sniffing, 114-115 injection attacks, 82, 83-86 integrity protection, IAX protocol and, 103 Inter-Asterisk eXchange (IAX) protocol. See IAX (Inter-Asterisk eXchange) protocol internal network, caller ID spoofing, with VoIP and SIP, 144 - 146INVITE method (SIP), 20, 23-25, 126-127 audit program and, 190 IP (Internet Protocol), for voice communications, 8 IP PBX, 11 IPSec, 15 ITU-T protocols, 49 IVR services for users, from Asterisk PBX. 136

## J

Jabber open source group, 170 jitter, 73 Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, 133

#### K

key distribution method, in SRTP, 183 Kismet, 175

## L

lab setup, 3-6, 132 Lackey, Zane, 84, 101, 104, 108, 163 landline home phone Microsoft Live Messenger calls to, 172 security, vs. VoIP security, 154 Yahoo! Messenger calls to, 168 language, hard phone configuration, 118 LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol), audit program, 191 libSRTP, 183 Linux, packages for RTPInject, 84 Live Messenger (Microsoft), 13, 172 lockout, reducing risk, 98 logging audit program, 196 security issues, 121 Lynksys, 173

#### M

MAC (Machine Access Control) addresses in E.164 alias, 14 enumerating on subnet, 159 filtering, 55 for wireless access point, 63 man-in-the-middle attack and, 76 management methods, audit program, 195 man-in-the-middle attacks in IAX, 102-103 in RTP, 76-77 Cain & Abel for, 78–80 in SIP, 36, 38 MD5 authentication, in IAX, 94-96

MD5 hash ASN.1-encoded buffer for, 58 audit program, 190 brute-force attacks, 166 from SIP User Agent, 28 SIP User Agent creation of response value, 33 MD5-to-plaintext downgrade attack, in IAX, 103-105 media encryption, audit program, 191 message flooding, for RTP Denial of Service attack, 88-89 messages, in SIP, 21-22 Microsoft Live Messenger, 13, 172 Modular Messaging (Avaya), 123-126 preventing authentication attacks, 125 Montoro, Massimiliano, 78, 159

### N

NAT (Network Address Translation), 186 national destination code (NDC), in E.164 alias, 14 National Do Not Call Registry, 147 Nemesis, 61 executing DoS attack, 69, 70 for RTP packet creation, 88-89, 90 - 91for UDP packet generation, 68 Nessus, 121 for discovering vulnerable services, 123 Net2Phone, 153 Netgear, 173 Network Address Translation (NAT), 186 network sniffing enumerating SIP usernames with, 32-33 and IAX registration traffic, 105 vendor-specific VoIP, 114-115

Network Time Protocol (NTP), Denial of Service via, 67–68 Nikto, 121 to scan web management interfaces, 122–123 nmap command, 25, 50–51 to scan VoIP devices, 121–122 nonce (challenge), 27, 28, 29 nonStandardMessage, Denial of Service via, 71–72 NTP (Network Time Protocol), Denial of Service via, 67–68

## 0

offline dictionary attack, 33, 35, 58, 166, 180 in IAX, 97–100 Open Ser TLS, implementation steps, 181 open STATE for IP address, and SIP device, 26 OpenSSH, security issues, 121 OpenSSL, security issues, 121 OPTIONS method (SIP), 21 OSI model, with VoIP, 10 outbound dialing, controls for, 66 Outlook plug-in, in Modular Messaging, security issues, 124

## P

packets, 9 generation tool, 61 passive dictionary attack, 99 passive eavesdropping of RTP, 76–82 man-in-the-middle attacks, 76–77 Cain & Abel for, 78–80 with Wireshark, 80–82 password verifiers, 95*n* password-equivalent values, 95

passwords hashing for H.323 protocol, 53 - 54retrieval in H.323 protocol attack, 58 - 59in SIP attack, 33-37 from Vonage, 166–167 for voicemail, 9 PayPal, as email phisher target, 151 PC-based VoIP solutions, 167–173 Google Talk, 13, 170–171 lightweight SPIT with, 150-151 Microsoft Live Messenger, 13, 172 Skype, 13, 153, 173 icon to initiate outgoing VoIP calls, 133–135 lightweight SPIT with, 150 - 151SOHO phone solutions, 173-175 Yahoo! Messenger, 13 audio insertion, 170 eavesdropping on, 168-170 phishing, 133-137 phones. See hard phones; soft phones PINs, for hard phones, audit program, 196 plaintext authentication, in IAX, 94 Polycom, VoIP hard phone, security issues, 115-120 port scan, 50 Nmap for, 121 ports, for VoIP, 186 power outage, and VoIP, 153 PowerPlay, 4 pre-computed attacks, 100-101 pre-recorded calls, sending over VoIP, 148-150 pre-texting, 140 privacy Modular Messaging risks to, 123 VoIP security and, 8 protocols, for VoIP, 9-11 PROTOS project, 46 Hacking VoIP (C) 2008 by Himanshu Dwivedi

Proxy server for SIP, 20 SBC interaction with, 187 pypcap library, installing, 84, 163

#### Q

QoS (Quality of Service) **RTCP** for sending information, 73 for SIP. 15 quality, of VoIP services, 154 QUELCH (Hold) attack, in IAX, 109 - 110

#### R

**RAS** (Registration Admission Status), for H.225 protocol, 55-56 Real Time Control Protocol (RTCP), 73 **Real-time Transport Protocol** (RTP), 9, 10 entropy, audit program, 192 receiving phishing calls, 136-137 Redirect server, for SIP, 20 redirecting calls, 146-147 H.323 gatekeepers, 127-128 REGAUTH packet, in downgrade attack, 104 REGISTER request (SIP), 21 audit program, 190 for Denial of Service attack, 44 Registrar server, for SIP, 20 **Registration Admission Status** (RAS), for H.225 protocol, 55-56 Registration Reject attack, in IAX, 106 - 107registration request (REGREQ) packet, for Asterisk server, 104 registration with SIP identified devices, 22-23, 26-27 hijacking in SIP attack, 38-41 replay attack for H.323 protocol, 60-63 MD5 hash vulnerability to, 95

response packet, from User Agent, 166 **RFC** (Request for Comments) 3261 on SIP, 19 3711 on Secure RTP, 181 RJ-45 connector, phones with, 11 RSA authentication, in IAX, 94 RTCP (Real Time Control Protocol), 73 RTCP Bye, for RTP Denial of Service attack, 89-91 **RTP** (Real-time Transport Protocol), 9, 10, 73 basics, 73–75 entropy, audit program, 192 packet exchange, 24 payload encryption, 181 ports, 186 security attacks, 75-91 RTP security attacks active eavesdropping, 82-87 audio insertion, 82-86 audio replacement, 87 Denial of Service, 88-91 message flooding, 88-89 RTCP Bye, 89–91 passive eavesdropping, 76-82 Cain & Abel for man-in-themiddle attacks, 78-80 man-in-the-middle attack. 76 - 77with Wireshark, 80-82 voice injection, 162-165 RTPInject, 84-86, 163, 175

#### S

S/MIME (Secure Multipurpose in Internet Mail Exchange), SIP with, 30–31 salted MD5 hashes, 60 SAS (Short Authentication String), for ZRTP, 184 SBC (Session Border Controller), 11, 50, 187, 188 Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Exchange (S/MIME), SIP with, 30–31 Hacking VoIP (C) 2008 by Himanshu Dwivedi

Secure Real Time Transfer Protocol (SRTP). See SRTP (Secure **Real Time Transfer** Protocol) Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). See SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) securing VoIP, 179-187 firewalls, 186 Session Border Controller (SBC), 11, 50, 187, 188 SIP over SSL/TSL (SIPS), 180-181 ZRTP and Zfone, 183-185 security, landline home phone vs. VoIP, 154 Security Denial Message, 65-66 sequence number for RTP, 74 in Vonage injection attack, 162-163 servers Asterisk, 26, 93, 132 configuring, 4 connecting SIP client to, 142 for free calls. 138 for IVR services for users, 136 man-in-the-middle attack of, 102-103 to send pre-recorded messages, 148-150 **SRTP** implementation steps, 183 DNS server audit program, 197 hard phone configuration, 118 lookup by Proxy server, 23 impersonation, 126–128 redirecting H.323 gatekeepers, 127-128 spoofing SIP proxies and registrars, 126-127 SIP/IAX/H.323 server concurrent sessions, audit program, 191 configuring, 4 SIP Proxy, 11 spoofing, 126-127 SIP server, configuring, 5

INDEX 207

services, on Cisco and Avaya products, 120-121 Session Border Controller (SBC), 11, 50, 187, 188 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). See SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) setup, for VoIP call, 10 Short Authentication String (SAS), for ZRTP, 184 Shulman, Jay, 147 signature file, in phisher's email client, 135 Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). See SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) Single Sign-On (SSO) token, for Google Talk authentication, 170 SIP (Session Initiation Protocol), 9,10 authentication, 27-29 audit program, 190 basics, 19-21 buffer overrun attacks, vs. IAX, 94 default authentication type, 13 encryption, 29-31 with S/MIME, 30-31 with TLS, 29-30 enumerating devices on network, 25-26 making VoIP call with, 22-25 **INVITE** request, 23–25 registration, 22-23 messages, 21-22 registration with identified devices, 26-27 security attacks, 31-47 Denial of Service via BYE message, 42-43 Denial of Service via REGISTER, 44 Denial of Service via un-register, 44-45 fuzzing SIP, 45-47 man-in-the-middle attack vite

password retrieval, 33-37 registration hijacking, 38-41 spoofing proxy servers and registrars, 41 tools to perform, 36-37 username enumeration, 31-33 server configuration, 5 VoIP deployments with devices, 12 for Vonage, 166 SIP client, 4 for caller ID spoofing, 142–143 configuring, 5 SIP/IAX/H.323 server concurrent sessions, audit program, 191 configuring, 4 SIP over SSL/TSL (SIPS), 180–181 SIP Proxy servers, 11 spoofing, 126-127 SIP Registrar, 11 sip.conffile, 4 backup, 132 and caller ID spoofing, 144 for Zfone, 184 SIPS (SIP over SSL/TSL), 180–181 SIP.Tastic tool, 36, 167, 168 SiVuS tool, 32, 40 Skype, 13, 153, 173 icon to initiate outgoing VoIP calls, 133-135 lightweight SPIT with, 150–151 SkypeOut, 138 Sniffer Pro, 61 for RTP packet creation, 88 sniffing network enumerating SIP usernames with, 32–33 and IAX registration traffic, 105 vendor-specific VoIP, 114-115 SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol), 195 exploiting weaknesses, 119 security issues, 121 social engineering, 132 soft phones, 11, 13, 20 Zfone and, 187 (C) 2008 by Himanshu Dwivedi

SOHO phone solutions, 173–175 Sox for Linux, 85, 164 spam attack, 131 spammer, voicemail from, 147 SPIT (Spam Over Internet Telephony), 147–151 spoofing caller ID, 139–146 with iaxComm and VoIPJet, 140 - 142impact, 146 on internal network with VoIP and SIP, 144-146 from services on websites, 143-144 with SIP client, 142-143 endpoint for H.323 protocol, 63 - 65**REJECT** packet, 107 SIP message, 40 SIP proxy servers and registrars, 41, 126-127 user identity, 39 SRTP (Secure Real Time Transfer Protocol), 15, 75 with HMAC-SHA1, 182-183 key distribution method, 183 key exchange, audit program, 192 media protection with AES cipher, 182 SSL (Secure Sockets Layer), 15 attacks on Google Talk, 170-171 audit program, 191 audit program for certificates, 197 certificates, 121 SSO (Single Sign-On) token, for Google Talk authentication, 170 SSRC number for RTP packet replacement, 87 in Vonage injection attack, 162-163 Stunnel, 15 subnet, enumerating MAC addresses on, 159

subscriber number (SN), in E.164 alias, 14 Swift, 136–137 switches, sniffing on, 76 symmetric encryption, for H.323 protocol, 52–53 synchronization, RTCP for, 89 synchronization source for RTP (SRRC), 74

## T

targeted attack, 146 with IAXHangup, 109 for testing IAXAuthJack, 105 for testing vnak, 102 telephone. See hard phones; soft phones telephone audio key tones, conversion to text, 137-138 telephone infrastructure, attacks, 7 telnet, security issues, 121 TFTP (Trivial File Transfer Protocol), as cleartext protocol, 116 timestamp for audio replacement, 87 audit program, 195 for H.323 authentication, 67 for MD5 hashing, 60 for RTP, 74 in Vonage injection attack, 162-163 TLS (Transport Layer Security) for Google Talk authentication, 170 for Microsoft Live Messenger, 172 for SIP, 29-30, 180 Yahoo! Messenger use of, 168 To field (SIP), 21 Trammel, Dustin T., 96 Transport Layer Security (TLS). See TLS (Transport Layer Security) Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP), as cleartext protocol, 116

## U

UDP (User Datagram Protocol), Denial of Service via, 68 - 69UDP port for IAX, 93 for RTP, 73 unconditional call forwarding, hard phone configuration, 118 un-register audit program, 191 for Denial of Service attack, 44 - 45URI (Uniform Resource Identifier) in E.164 alias, 14 for SIP, 22 User Agents, 13 response packet from, 166 for SIP, 20 registration, 26, 39 username enumeration for H.323 protocol, 56-57 in IAX, 96-97 in SIP attack, 31–33 username retrieval, from Vonage, 166 - 167

### V

Verizon, 172 vishing, 133–135 VLANs audit program, 194 for VoIP network, 114 VMware Player, 4, 26 vnak utility, 36, 101–102 voice calls, sensitivity, 9 voice injection, in Vonage, 162–165 voice network, separating data network from, 15 audit program, 194 voicemail for mobile phones, access to, 146 from spammer, 147 voicemail passcode, 124 VoIP (Voice over IP), 7. See also home VoIP services; infrastructure VoIP attacks auditing for security best practices, 189-197 basics, 9-13 deployments, 11–13 protocols, 9-11 commercial solutions, 154-167 impact of DoS attack, 106 OSI model with, 10 PC-based solutions, 167–173 Google Talk, 170–171 Microsoft Live Messenger, 172 Skype, 173 SOHO phone solutions, 173 - 175Yahoo! Messenger, 168–170 VoIP (Voice over IP) security attack vectors, 15-16 basics, 13-15 authentication, 13-14 authorization, 14 availability, 14-15 encryption, 15 importance, 8-9 unconventional threats, 131-132 anonymous eavesdropping and call redirection, 146 - 147caller ID spoofing, 139-146 making free calls, 138-139 phishing, 133–137 receiving calls, 136-137 SPIT (Spam Over Internet Telephony), 147-151 VoIP Security Audit Program (VSAP), 190-197 downloading, 190 VoIPBuster, for free calls, 138 VoIPJet, 140–142, 150 VoIPonCD-appliance, 132

Vonage, 153 security attacks, 154–161 call eavesdropping, 157–161 probabilities, 156 username/password retrieval, 166–167 voice injection, 162–165 VSAP (VoIP Security Audit Program), 190–197 downloading, 190

#### W

.wav files decoding RTP packets to, 78, 80 RTPInject transcoding of, 85 website services, for caller ID spoofing, 143-144 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy), 157, 174-175 Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), 157, 174 - 175wildcard attack with IAXHangup, 109 for testing IAXAuthJack, 105 Windows Sound Recorder, 85, 164 Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), 157, 174-175 wireless technology, 16 attack surface on home devices, 156 Wireshark, 33 to capture RTP packets, 158 dialedDigits line for destination E.164 alias, 65 for H.225.0 RAS entry, 61 and MD5 hash with H.225 packet, 62 to reassemble RTP packets, 80 - 82for sniffing H.323-ID, 56-57 stream analysis, 81 WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access), 157, 174 - 175

# X

X-Lite, 4, 5, 26–27 connecting SIP client to Asterisk server, 142 for free calls, 138 for targeted attack, 147 using Zfone with, 184–185 XEP (XMPP Extension Protocols), 170 XMPP (Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol), for Google Talk, 170

## Y

Yahoo! Messenger, 13 audio insertion, 170 eavesdropping on, 168–170

# Z

Zfone, 183–185 ZRTP, 183–185